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Gardner: Gardner: Accidental Death Insurance Coverage of Drunk Drivers

Notes
Accidental Death Insurance Coverage
of Drunk Drivers
Gaddy v. HartfordLife Insurance Co.'
I. INTRODUCTION

Drunk driving causes the deaths of thousands of Americans each year.2 The
drunk driver is often among those killed. This raises the question of whether the
beneficiaries of an insured killed as a result of his own drunk driving can claim
the proceeds of an accidental death and dismemberment insurance policy. The
answer to this question depends on whether the drunk driver's death is
considered an "accident" for first-party insurance coverage purposes. State and
federal courts have largely split on this question. In Gaddy v. HartfordLife
Insurance Co., the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri, applying Missouri law, concluded that such a death is not an
"accident."'
I. FACTS AND HOLDING
Charles Gaddy was killed in an automobile accident on June 27, 1998. 4 He
was returning home from a grocery store when he lost control of his vehicle and
drove off the road, overcorrected, and collided with an oncoming car.5 Both
Gaddy and the other driver died at the scene.6 The Missouri State Highway
Patrol tested blood drawn from Gaddy and determined that he was intoxicated
at the time of the accident.7 His blood alcohol content measured 0.21 percent,

1. 218 F. Supp. 2d 1123 (E.D. Mo. 2002).
2. See NAT'L CENTER FOR STATISTICAL ANALYSIS, NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC
SAFETY ADMIN., TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS 2002: ALCOHOL, at iii (2002), available at
http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/nrd-30/NCSA/TSFAnn/TSF2002Final.pdf. A study
found that in 2002, 17,419 people were killed in automobile crashes involving alcohol.
This represented forty-one percent of those killed in all automobile crashes that year. Id.
3. Gaddy, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1128.
4. Id. at 1125.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 1126.
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more than twice the legal limit at the time.' The Highway Patrol concluded that
Gaddy's intoxication caused the crash.9
Gaddy's children submitted a claim to Hartford Life Insurance Company
("Hartford") for the benefits of Gaddy's accidental death and dismemberment
insurance policy.' Hartford refused to pay the proceeds, arguing that Gaddy's
death was not an "accident" because it was proximately caused by his driving
while intoxicated."
In response, Gaddy's children filed a breach of contract action against
Hartford in the Circuit Court for the City of St. Louis, claiming that they were
entitled to the proceeds of his insurance policy. 2 Hartford removed the case to
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri on diversity
grounds." Both parties moved for summaryjudgment.' 4
Senior District Judge Stephen N. Limbaugh granted Hartford's motion for
summary judgment.' The court, applying Missouri law, concluded that there
was no genuine issue ofmaterial fact and that Hartford was entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.' 6 The court reasoned that Gaddy's death was not an accident
because it was foreseeable that operating a motor vehicle in a state of
intoxication could result in death. 7 When an insured's death is proximately
caused by his driving while intoxicated, the death is foreseeable and is therefore
not an accident for first-party insurance coverage purposes.'

8. Id. The state statute at the time of the accident defined an intoxicated driver as
one who operates a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content of at least 0.10 percent.
Id. at 1126 n.2. The General Assembly has since revised this statute to lower the legal
limit to 0.08 percent. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 577.012.1 (2000).
9. Gaddy, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1126.
10. Id.
11. Id.

12. Id. at 1124.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1129.
Id.
Id. at 1128.

Id.
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. The Meaning of "Accident" in Missouri
1. Policies Covering Death by "Accidental Means"
To claim the proceeds of an accidental death policy in Missouri, the
beneficiary must prove that the insured died as the result of an accident as a
condition precedent to the insurance company's duty to pay. 9 Missouri courts
distinguish policies that provide coverage for "accidental" deaths from those that
provide coverage for deaths that occur by "accidental means."20 Under an
"accidental means" policy, although an injury may be unusual or unexpected, it
is not considered an accident if the "means causing the injury has been employed
by the insured in the usual and expected way."'" The Missouri Supreme Court
discussed this approach in 1924 in Caldwell v. Travelers' Insurance Co. where
the plaintiff sought the benefits of her late husband's accidental death policy
after he died during surgery.22 The policy covered death "from bodily injuries,
effected directly and independently of all other causes, through external, violent,
and accidental means." The husband died after an obstruction
of the bowel
24
occurred during a skillfully performed hernia operation.
The Caldwellcourt examined the two different approaches that courts take
in interpreting policies that provide coverage for deaths that occur by

"accidental means."2 The first approach distinguishes between "accidental
means" and "accidental results." These courts hold that where an unusual or
unexpected result occurs because of an intentional act by the insured, the
resulting death is not caused by accidental means.2 The means must have been
accidental, and it is not sufficient that only the result was unusual, unexpected,
or unforeseen. The second approach does not distinguish "accidental means"
from "accidental results"-where death is an unusual, unexpected, or unforeseen
result of an intentional act, the death is by accidental means.2" The Caldwell

19. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Underwood, 377 S.W.2d 459, 462 (Mo.
1964) (citing Caldwell v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 267 S.W. 907 (Mo. 1924) (en banc)).
20. See Caldwell, 267 S.W. at 907.
21. Applebury v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 379 S.W.2d 867,870 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1964).
22. Caldwell, 267 S.W. at 908.
23. Id. at 907.
24. Id. at 908.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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court noted that numerous Missouri cases had followed the latter line of cases,29
but held that the former approach, distinguishing "accidental means" from
"accidental results," was the proper standard.3 ° Applying this standard, the court
held that in order to recover, the beneficiary had to show that something
unforeseen, unusual, or unexpected and unintended happened during the
operation and that this caused the insured's death.3' The court concluded that the
beneficiary had failed to meet this standard because she had merely shown that
an unforeseen, unusual, and unexpected result occurred after the operation.32
The St. Louis Court of Appeals later clarified the Caldwell holding in
Murphy v. Western & SouthernLife InsuranceCo.," where the insured died after
taking an overdose of a prescription drug.34 The court, consistent with Caldwell,
held that in order to find accidental means, there must be "an element of
unexpectedness in the means which produces the result."3 The court noted that
the external force which causes the injury may be applied intentionally, with or
without the insured's consent.36 The court concluded that the insured's death
was not by accidental means because he knew he was taking the prescription
drug.37 Although he may not have known he was taking an overdose, he did

29. Id. at 908-11 (citing Beile v. Travelers' Protective Ass'n of Am., 135 S.W. 497
(Mo. Ct. App. 1911); Young v. Ry. Mail Ass'n, 103 S.W. 557 (Mo. Ct. App. 1907);
Columbia Paper Stock Co. v. Fid. &Cas. Co., 78 S.W. 320 (Mo. Ct. App. 1904)).
30. Id. at 909. Missouri is in the minority of states on this issue. Most states have
rejected the distinction between "accidental means" and "accidental results" and thus
permit recovery if death is merely an unforeseen result. See, e.g., Botts v. Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co., 585 P.2d 657 (Or. 1978); see also ROBERT H. JERRY, II,
UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 63B, at 477 (3d ed. 2002) (citing cases); Russell S.

Baldwin, Comment, Harrell v. Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance:

Tennessee's

Emergence from the Serbonian Bog?, 27 U. MEM. L. REV. 745, 753 (1997). The

"means/results" distinction has been sharply criticized by scholars and courts alike as
being an unworkable standard that is inconsistent with the insured's expectations of
coverage. See Peter Nash Swisher, Judicial Interpretations of Insurance Contract
Disputes: Toward a Realistic Middle Ground Approach, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 543, 580

(1996). The critics frequently cite a famous dissent by Justice Cardozo in which he
criticized the "means/results" distinction and warned that it would "plunge this branch
of law into a Serbonian Bog." Landress v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 291 U.S. 491,499
(1934) (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
31. Caldwell,267 S.W. at 921. The court relied on a similar holding by the United
States Supreme Court in United States Mutual Accident Ass 'n v. Barry, 131 U.S. 100
(1889). Caldwell, 267 S.W. at 920-21.
32. Caldwell, 267 S.W. at 921.

33. 262 S.W.2d 340 (Mo. Ct. App. 1953).
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 341.
Id. at 343.
Id.
Id.
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intentionally take the medicine; only the result, death, was unexpected.38 The
court noted that if the insured had slipped and accidentally swallowed more of
the medicine than he intended, the death would have been by accidental means.39
The accidental means analysis was applied in a different context in
Applebury v. JohnHancockMutualLife InsuranceCo.' where the insured died
in an automobile accident during a high-speed chase with police.4' The
insurance company denied benefits because it did not consider the death to be
by accidental means. 2 In affirming the judgment for the insurance company, the
court held that knowingly running from the police is a "voluntary and wanton
'
exposure to danger."43
2. "Accidental" Death Policies
For insurance policies that contain more general language covering all
deaths that are "accidental," a different, simpler analysis is used. In Stogsdill v.
GeneralAmerican Life InsuranceCo.,' the insured's wife shot and killed him
as he allegedly beat her and her children.4 His beneficiary sought the proceeds
of his accidental death policy." The insurance company denied the benefits,
arguing that the insured's death was not an accident because, as an aggressor
killed in the course of his aggression, he assumed the risk of death.47
Determining if the death was accidental depended on whether his death was
unforeseeable and unexpected or whether it was a natural or probable
consequence of his actions." The court concluded that where the danger of
death the insured has exposed himself to is the result of his own aggression, the
determination of whether death was foreseeable depends on the nature of his
aggression and the resistance likely to be used to repel it.49 If a beneficiary
shows that the aggression was not of the type that would have made the insured
anticipate deadly resistance, then the death was not foreseeable, and hence, the
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. 379 S.W.2d 867 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964).
41. Id. at 869. Witnesses estimated the insured's speed at ninety to one hundred
miles per hour. Id.
42. Id. at 870.
43. Id. at 874.
44. 541 S.W.2d 696 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
45. Id. at 699.
46. Id. at 698.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 699.
49. Id. (citing Winston v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 469 S.W.2d 51 (Mo. Ct. App.
1971); Perringer v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 244 S.W.2d 607 (Mo. Ct. App. 1951); Podesta
v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 150 S.W.2d 596 (Mo. Ct. App. 1941)).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004
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death was the result of an accident." Conversely, if the insured's attack would
have made him expect the use of deadly force by the other party, the death was
not accidental."' In Stogsdill, the court concluded that whether the insured
expected death was a question for the jury. 2
A similar case, Herbst v. J C. Penney InsuranceCo.," held that the test was
whether a reasonableperson would expect that the action of the insured would
result in death. 4 In Herbst,the insured was shot and killed by his wife after he
threatened her with a severe beating. 5 His beneficiary claimed that his death
was an accident and was not foreseeable because his drunken state prevented
him from realizing that his wife might use force against him. 6 The court
rejected this argument, holding that what could be anticipated was not based on
what the drunken insured might have expected, but on what a reasonable person
would ordinarily expect."7

Cappo v. Allstate Life Insurance Co. 8 provides another example where a
court held that a reasonable person would have anticipated death. In Cappo,the
insured was known by police to be involved in organized crime. 9 He had told
his wife that he had large gambling debts before he went to meet with what he
described as "some pretty bad people." He made arrangements for his wife and
his lawyer to take certain actions in the event that he did not return from the
meeting, stating that they would know that the people at the meeting had "got"
him.6 He never returned from the meeting.62 The court held that the insured's
death was not accidental because it was clear that he consciously and voluntarily
decided to go to the meeting and by doing so he expressly anticipated his death. 3
In other words, his death was a reasonable consequence of his decision to go to
the meeting;" it was not unforeseen, unusual, or unexpected, and thus it was not
an accident.
In Missouri, the meaning of accidental death depends on the language used
in the particular insurance policy. For policies that cover deaths by "accidental
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.

53.
54.
55.
56.

679 S.W.2d 381 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
Id. at 383.
Id. at 382.
Id. at 383.

57. Id.

58. 809 S.W.2d 131 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 134.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

64. Id. at 135.
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means," there must be something unexpected or unforeseeable in the means
which results in death. It is not enough that the result itself is unforeseeable. For
policies which simply cover "accidental" deaths, the question is whether a
reasonable person would expect death to result.
B. Other States 'Approaches to Drunk Driving
Several states have dealt with the question of whether the beneficiaries of
an insured killed as a result of his drunk driving can claim the proceeds of an
accidental death and dismemberment policy. These states have generally
concluded that such deaths are accidental. In Freeman v. Crown Life Insurance
Co., the Texas Court of Civil Appeals heard such a case. The insured died
after a car crash." At the time of the collision, his blood alcohol content was
between 0.188 percent and 0.207 percent.67 His insurance company refused to
pay accidental death benefits, arguing that his death was non-accidental because
he died while driving drunk.68 Rejecting this argument, the court quoted
Professor Appleman: "'While drunken driving is dangerous (and should be
prevented) the public still regards such an accident as "accidental". To rule to
the contrary is to deny the terminology the ordinary meaning given by the
public." 69 The court, relying on Texas case law, stated, "More is required than
a simple showing that the insured could have reasonably foreseen that injury or
death might result."7 The Freeman court continued:
[T]he insured must have acted in such a way that he should have
reasonably known that his actions would probably result in his death.
Unquestionably, driving while intoxicated is a serious violation of the
law and an extremely dangerous act, but we do not believe it is such
an act that one who commits it can be said to reasonably know that it
will probably bring about his own death.7

65.
66.
67.
68.

580 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
Id. at 899.
Id.
Id.
69. Id. (quoting 1A JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW
AND PRACTICE § 467, n.76.25 (Supp. 1978)). This passage by Professor Appleman was

also quoted approvingly in an Oregon case with similar facts. See Harbeintner v. Crown
Life Ins. Co., 612 P.2d 334, 335 (Or. Ct. App. 1980).
70. Freeman, 580 S.W.2d at 900 (citing Releford v. Reserve Life Ins. Co., 276
S.W.2d 517 (Tex. 1955)).
71. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004
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The Alabama Supreme Court addressed the issue in Hearn v. Southern Life
InsuranceCo.72 In Hearn,the insured was involved in a high-speed chase with
police."' His car crashed into a gully and caught fire. 4 He died of smoke
inhalation while trying to escape through ajammed car door." His blood alcohol
content measured 0.11 percent. 6 The Hearn court reversed the trial court's
directed verdict for the insurance company and refused to hold as a matter of law
that the death was non-accidental." Rather, the court held that the jury was free
to reject the theory that he "intended to die from smoke inhalation while pinned
in his car."78

In Fryman v. Pilot Life InsuranceCo.," the Kentucky Supreme Court also
found a drunk driver's death to be accidental. ° The court held that a death is
accidental "absent a showing that the death was a result of plan, design or intent
on the part of the decedent."'" The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit later relied on this holding in American Family Life Insurance Co. v.
Bilyeu, 2 a diversity case in which the court applied Kentucky law.83 The court
held that the insured's death was an accident even though at the time of the crash
she had a blood alcohol content of 0.20 percent and was driving over fifty-five
miles per hour in a thirty-five mile per hour zone."
The Tennessee Supreme Court, in Harrell v. Minnesota Mutual Life
InsuranceCo.," rejected the state's longstanding distinction between "accidental
means" and "accidental results. 86 The court also rejected the insurance
company's argument that death is the foreseeable consequence of drunk driving,
stating, "Where, as here, the insured died as the result of an intentional act, such
as voluntary intoxication, but did not intend or expect death to7result, such death
is accidental for the purposes of an accidental death policy."A
Insurance companies have sometimes argued that courts should deny
payment of accidental death benefits to beneficiaries of drunk drivers on public
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

454 So. 2d 932 (Ala. 1984).
Id. at 933.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 935.
Id.
704 S.W.2d 205 (Ky. 1986).
Id. at 206.
Id.
921 F.2d 87 (6th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 89.
Id. at 88-89.
937 S.W.2d 809 (Tenn. 1996).
Id. at 810, 814.
Id. at 815.
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policy grounds. In Consumers Life InsuranceCo. v. Smith,"" the Maryland Court
of Special Appeals rejected an insurance company's argument that beneficiaries
should not recover in such instances because the state legislature had acted to
deter drunk driving. 9 The court noted that it found nothing in the enactments of
the legislature pertaining to drunk driving and insurance benefits.90 The
Oklahoma Supreme Court also rejected such an argument in a recent case,
Cranfill v. Aetna Life Insurance Co.9 While the court acknowledged that the
state had a strong public policy against drunk driving, it did not believe that
denying benefits to the beneficiaries of drunk drivers would further the policy.92
The Smith and Cranfill courts both found the drunk drivers' deaths to be
accidental and thus covered under their insurance policies.93
The few cases in which courts applying state law have denied coverage for
the death of a drunk driver have involved policies stipulating that death must
'
occur by "accidental means." 94
As such, these cases do not dispel the
overwhelming trend of state courts to find drunk drivers' deaths "accidental."
C. DrunkDrivingand FederalERISA Cases
The question of whether the death of an insured caused by his driving while
intoxicated is accidental has been addressed by federal courts in cases arising
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"). 95
Federal courts look to federal common law in defining what constitutes an
"accident" in ERISA cases.96 Most of these courts have based their reasoning
on Wickman v. Northwestern NationalInsuranceCo.,97 a 1990 First Circuit case
that has been described as the "primary embodiment of federal common law in

88. 587 A.2d 1119 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990).
89. Id. at 1122-23 (citing Maryland's drunk driving statutes).
90. Id. at 1123.
91. 49 P.3d 703 (Okla. 2002).
92. Id. at 709.
93. Smith, 587 A.2d at 1125; Cranfill,49 P.3d at 709.
94. See Buce v. Allianz Life Ins. Co., 247 F.3d 1133 (11th Cir. 2001) (denying
coverage in ERISA case where contract stipulated application of Georgia law, which
recognized "accidental means" distinction); Smith v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 872 F.
Supp. 482 (W.D. Term. 1994) (applying Tennessee law). At the time of the Smith case,
Tennessee recognized the "means/results" distinction. Id. at 482-83. However, the
Tennessee Supreme Court later abandoned the distinction in Harrellv. Minn. Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 937 S.W.2d 809 (Tenn. 1996).
95. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000).
96. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987). See generally
JeffreyA. Brauch, The FederalCommon Law ofERISA, 21 HARV. J.L. &PUB. POL'Y 541
(1998).
97. 908 F.2d 1077 (1st Cir. 1990).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004

9

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 10
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW

(Vol. 69

the area of accidental death benefits."9 In Wickman, the insured parked his car
on a ninety-foot bridge, climbed over the guardrail and held on with one hand,
and fell to the ground.99 He later died from his injuries.' 00 His insurance
company denied accidental death coverage on the grounds that his death was a
suicide. 1 ' The Wickman court rejected any test relying on the distinction
between "accidental means" and "accidental results,"'0 2 and instead formulated
a three-step test to determine whether an insured's death is an accident. The test
first asks whether the insured reasonably expected an injury similar to the one
that occurred.'0 3 If the insured did not expect such an injury, the court then asks
whether his belief that injury would not result was reasonable.' °
Reasonableness is to be analyzed first from the perspective of the insured,
"taking into account [his] personal characteristics and experiences."'0 5 In the
event that the insured's subjective expectations cannot be ascertained, the court
asks whether a reasonable person, with the same background and characteristics
as the insured, "would have viewed the injury as highly likely to occur as a result
of the insured's intentional conduct."'" Applying this test, the Wickman court
affirmed the magistrate's conclusion that the insured's death was not accidental
because he "knew or should have known that serious bodily injury or death was
a probabl[e] consequence substantially likely to occur as a result of his volitional
himself on the outside of the guardrail and hanging on with one
act in placing
07
hand."'
Federal courts have since applied the Wickman test in the drunk driving
context. Generally, these courts have construed the test in terms of the "quasiobjective" aspect of step three.'0 " This focuses on what someone similar to the
insured would have expected to result from the insured's act. In Miller v. AutoAlliance International,Inc. ,"9 the insured driver died in an automobile accident

while he was intoxicated.

°

His insurance company denied accidental death

98. Bevans v. Iron Workers' Tri-State Welfare Plan, 971 F. Supp 357, 361 (C.D.
I1.1997).

99. Wiclunan, 908 F.2d at 1079-80.
100. Id. at 1080.
101. Id.
at 1081.
102. Id. at 1086.
103. Id. at 1088.

104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. (emphasis added).
107. Id. at 1089.
108. See Adam F. Scales, Man, God and the Serbonian Bog: The Evolution of
Accidental Death Insurance, 86 IowA L. REv. 173, 296 (2000).

109. 953 F. Supp. 172 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
110. Id. at 173.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss1/10
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benefits, and his beneficiaries filed suit."' The court granted the insurance
company's motion for summary judgment, accepting its argument that the
insured should have foreseen the dangers of driving while intoxicated because
they are well-known and widely publicized."' This rationale has been used by
federal courts in several decisions."'
However, there are two ERISA cases where courts have interpreted
Wicknan to support the proposition that the death of an insured caused by his
drunk driving is accidental. In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Potter,"4 the
court denied the insurance company's motion for summary judgment, which
claimed that the insured's death was non-accidental because it was caused by her
drunk driving and was therefore reasonably foreseeable and expected.'" The
Potter court criticized the reasoning used in Miller and other ERISA drunk
driving cases as misapplication of the Wickman test." 6 The court asserted that
a death is non-accidental under Wickman only when the insured expected to die,
or where a reasonable person in the insured's position would have seen death as
"highly likely to occur" and that "any other expectation would be
unreasonable.""' In Potter, the court concluded that there was insufficient
evidence to make a determination under the Wickman test."' The court found
no evidence of the insured's subjective expectations and, more significantly,
refused to find as a matter of law that death was "highly likely to occur" as a
result of driving while intoxicated.' '9 The court supported this conclusion by
pointing out that many drunk drivers do not die in car accidents. 20
A recent decision, West v. Aetna Life InsuranceCo.,2l expounded on the
Pottercourt's criticism of the way federal courts have applied the Wickman test
in the drunk driving context. The West court criticized other courts' reliance on
vague arguments based on "common knowledge," "the media," "drunk driving
laws," and extremely high blood alcohol content levels to conclude that death is

111. Id.

112. Id. at 176-77.
113. See Walker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 24 F. Supp. 2d 775, 781 (E.D. Mich.
1997); Schultz v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 994 F. Supp. 1419, 1422 (M.D. Fla. 1997); Nelson
v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 962 F. Supp. 1010, 1012-13 (W.D. Mich. 1997);
Fowler v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 938 F. Supp. 476,480 (W.D. Tenn. 1996).
114. 992 F. Supp. 717 (D.N.J. 1998).
115. Id. at 721, 730.
116. Id. at 729.
117. Id. (quoting Wickman v. N.W. Nat'l Ins. Co., 908 F.2d 1077, 1088-89 (1st
Cir. 1990)).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 729-30.
120. Id. at 730.
121. 171 F. Supp. 2d 856 (N.D. Iowa 2001).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2004
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"highly likely" to result from driving drunk.122 The court acknowledged that
these things show that drunk driving is "irresponsible and dangerous," but
maintained that driving drunk is not "highly likely" to result in the driver's
"' To support this, the court noted a study indicating that
death. 23
in a year where
there were over a million drunk driving arrests, there were only 17,218 deaths
from drunk driving accidents. 24
Federal courts have largely relied on the test set forth in Wickman v.
NorthwesternNationalInsuranceCo. 2 ' in determining if the death of an insured
proximately caused by his driving while intoxicated is accidental under insurance
policies governed by ERISA. Although most courts applying this test have
found such deaths to be non-accidental, some courts have applied the Wiclanan
test to conclude that a reasonable person would not view death as "highly likely"
to result from driving drunk. The divergence of federal courts' approaches to
drunk driving in accidental death insurance cases is largely based on differing
views of what reasonable people would anticipate.

IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Gaddy v. HarfordLife Insurance Co., the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri, applying Missouri law, concluded that when
an insured's death is proximately caused by his driving while intoxicated, the
death is foreseeable and is therefore non-accidental for first-party insurance
coverage purposes. 26 The court acknowledged that no Missouri courts had
addressed the issue. 27 Accordingly, as a federal court sitting in diversity, the

122. Id. at 901 (criticizing Cozzie v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 140 F.3d 1104 (7th Cir.
1998); Mullaney v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 103 F. Supp. 2d 486 (D.R.I. 2000); Walker
v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 24 F. Supp. 2d 775 (E.D. Mich. 1997); Schultz v. Metro. Life Ins.
Co., 994 F. Supp. 1419 (M.D. Fla. 1997); Nelson v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 962
F. Supp. 1010 (W.D. Mich. 1997); Miller v. Auto-Alliance Int'l, Inc., 953 F. Supp. 172
(E.D. Mich. 1997); Cates v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 1024 (E.D. Tenn.
1996)).
123. Id. at 904 (emphasis added).
124. Id. The court noted a study conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
that was admitted as a plaintiff's exhibit. Id.
125. 908 F.2d 1077 (1st Cir. 1990).
126. Gaddy v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1128-29 (E.D. Mo.
2002). This is to be contrasted with the meaning of "accident" for liability insurance
policies. Indeed, even though Gaddy's death was not considered an "accident" for his
first-party policy, the death of the other driver in the crash was covered as "accidental"
under Gaddy's liability policy. For a discussion of the meaning of the word "accident"
in first-party and third-party liability policies, see LEE R. Russ, COUCH ON INSURANCE
§ 139:5 (3d ed. 2001).
127. Gaddy, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1127.
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court had28 the duty to predict how the Missouri Supreme Court would rule on the
matter.1
The court noted that Gaddy's beneficiaries carried the burden of proving
that his death was an accident in order for Hartford's duty to pay to arise. 129 The
court then cited numerous cases in which the Missouri Court of Appeals
determined whether deaths were "accidental" for first-party insurance coverage
purposes. 30 Although Gaddy's policy covered "accidental" deaths, the court
also cited Missouri cases that involved "accidental means" policies. 3'
The court concluded that accidental death insurance benefits are not
required to be paid when the insured's death results unexpectedly from an
affirmative choice to expose himself to a "known peril" that a reasonable person
would consider dangerous. 3 2 The court applied an objective standard to the
question of whether the insured should have appreciated the danger of the
situation.' If a reasonable person would have expected serious injury or death,
then the beneficiaries of the insured cannot recover. 34 The court recognized that
in this type of analysis, Missouri courts trace "the chain of causation back to the
last intentional act of the insured."'35 If the resulting injury or death was a
"probable and natural consequence" of the insured's intentional act, it was not
an accident.' 36
Applying these principles, the court concluded that Gaddy's death was not
an accident for first-party insurance coverage purposes.'37 The court pointed out
that Gaddy voluntarily decided to drive his car while he was drunk. 3 A
reasonable person, the court asserted, appreciates that driving while intoxicated

128. Id. (citing ANR W. Coal Dev. Co. v. Basin Elec. Power Co-op., 276 F.3d 957,
964 (8th Cir. 2002); Lincoln Benefit Life Co. v.Edwards, 243 F.3d 457, 465 (8th Cir.
2001)).
129. Id. (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Underwood, 377 S.W.2d 459,
462 (Mo. 1964)).
130. Id. (citing Cappo v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 809 S.W.2d 131 (Mo. Ct. App.
1991); Piva v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 647 S.W.2d 866 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Stogsdill
v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 541 S.W.2d 696 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976)).
131. See Applebury v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 379 S.W.2d 867 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1964); Murphy v. W. &S. Life Ins. Co., 262 S.W.2d 340 (Mo. Ct. App. 1953).
132. Gaddy,218 F.Supp. 2d at 1128 (citing Applebury, 379 S.W.2d at 871).
133. Id.(citing Herbst v.J.C. Penney Ins. Co., 679 S.W.2d 381, 383 (Mo.Ct.App.

1984)).
134. Id. (citing Herbst, 679 S.W.2d at 383).
135. Id.

136. Id. (citing Cappo v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 809 S.W.2d 131 (Mo. Ct. App.
1991); Herbst,679 S.W.2d at 381; Stogsdill v.Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 541 S.W.2d 696
(Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Applebury, 379 S.W.2d at 867; Murphy, 262 S.W.2d at 340).
137. Id.at 1128-29.
138. Id.at 1128.
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poses a serious risk of injury or death.'39 Therefore, Gaddy's death was 4a
foreseeable result of his intentional act of driving while he was intoxicated.1 0
noted that this conclusion was consistent with the majority of federal
The court
41
courts.'

Further evidence that a reasonable person would have known of the serious
danger of death, the court maintained, was the fact that Gaddy could have been
charged with driving while intoxicated 142 and involuntary manslaughter had he
survived. 43 The court reasoned that since state statutes have specified that
driving drunk and causing injury is a "felonious, intentional act," Missouri courts
would not consider the death of a drunk driver to be accidental.44
In sum, the Gaddy court concluded that the death of an insured proximately
caused by his driving while intoxicated is not an accident under insurance
coverage45because death or serious bodily harm is foreseeable to a reasonable
person.

V. COMMENT
The Gaddy court held that Gaddy's death was foreseeable because he
intentionally faced a known peril that a reasonable person would expect to cause
death or serious injury.'" This is similar to the reasoning of the federal courts
that have interpreted ERISA to find that drunk driving deaths are non-accidental
because a reasonable person would view death as a likely result. 47 Critics argue
that this rationale is not consistent with reality or with what reasonable people

139. Id. (citing Cozzie v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 140 F.3d 1104, 1110 (7th Cir.
1998); Nelson v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 962 F. Supp. 1010, 1012 (W.D. Mich.
1997)).
140. Id.
141. Id. (citing Baker v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 171 F.3d 939, 943

(4th Cir. 1999); Walker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 24 F. Supp. 2d 775, 782 (E.D. Mich.
1997); Schultz v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 994 F. Supp. 1419, 1422 (M.D. Fla. 1997); Miller
v. Auto-Alliance Int'l, Inc., 953 F. Supp. 172, 176 (E.D. Mich. 1997)).
142. Id.; see Mo. REV. STAT. § 577.012 (2000).
143. Gaddy, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1128; see Mo. REV. STAT. §565.024.1 (2) (2000).
144.
145.
146.
147.

Gaddy, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1128.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Walker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 24 F. Supp. 2d 775 (E.D. Mich.

1997); Schultz v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 994 F. Supp. 1419 (M.D. Fla. 1997); Nelson v.
Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 962 F. Supp. 1010 (W.D. Mich. 1997); Miller v. AutoAlliance Int'l, Inc., 953 F. Supp. 172 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
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think. 4' As discussed earlier, the court in West v. Aetna Life Insurance Co. 49
supported its conclusion that death is not "highly likely" to result by noting a
survey showing a great disparity between the number of drunk driving arrests
and the number of deaths caused by drunk driving.'
Indeed, a more recent
survey conducted by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
indicated that although approximately 1.4 million people are arrested for drunk
driving each year, only 8,474 intoxicated drivers died in automobile crashes in
2002. '' Further, as the West court noted, not every drunk driver is arrested each
time they drive while intoxicated.'
Therefore, even as impressive as these
statistics are, they still overstate the likelihood that drunk drivers will die as a
result of their own drunk driving. Indeed, the West court had it right when it
stated:
What "common knowledge" should actually tell a person driving
while intoxicated is that he or she is far more likely to be arrested for
driving while intoxicated than to die orbe injured in an alcohol-related
automobile crash, and far more likely to arrive home than to be either
arrested, injured, or killed." 3
The argument that most people would not view death as likely to result from
driving while intoxicated is supported by other statistics as well. For example,
a recent survey indicated that about twenty-one percent of driving-age Americans
reported that they had operated an automobile shortly after drinking in the past
year.5 4 About nine percent of the time, the respondents estimated that their
blood alcohol content was 0.08 percent or above.' Studies estimate that drivers
with a blood alcohol content of 0.08 percent or higher make nearly ninety-four
million driving trips each year.'5 6 Such a high number of Americans admitting

148. See, e.g., West v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 171 F. Supp. 2d 856, 903-04 (N.D.
Iowa 200 1).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 904.
151.

NAT'L CENTER FOR STATISTICAL ANALYsIs, supra note

2.

152. West, 171 F. Supp. 2d at 904.
153. Id.
154. JAMEs H. HEDLUND &ANNET. MCCARTT, PREUSSER RESEARCH GROUP, INC.,
AAA FOUNDATION FOR TRAFFIC SAFETY, DRUNK DRIVING: SEEKING ADDITIONAL

SOLUTIONS, at v (May 2002)

availableat http://www.aaafoundation.org/pdf/DrunkDriv

ing-SeekingAdditionalSolutions.pdf.

155. Id. at 8.
156. THE GALLUP ORGANIZATION, NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN.,
VOLUME 1: SUMMARY REPORT-NAT'L SURVEY OF DRINKING AND DRIVING-ATTUDES

AND BEHAVIORS (2003),

availableat http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/injury/alcohol/m
arvin-drink-driveO 1/vol 1Sum.pdf.
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to driving after drinking strongly supports the proposition that a reasonable
person would not anticipate death as a result.
However, other statistics could be used to support the argument that a
reasonable person would expect death or injury. A Gallup survey indicated that
ninety-seven percent of the driving-age public view drinking and driving by
others as a threat to their personal safety. "7 Another study found that Americans
rank drunk driving as their top highway safety concern.' These statistics make
it clear that Americans are certainly afraid of being killed or injured by the drunk
driving of another. However, they do not directly answer whether Americans are
afraid of dying as a result of their own drunk driving.
Notably, there is a clear split between state and federal courts on this
issue. "59
' While courts applying state law have largely found such deaths to be
accidental, 6 ° federal courts interpreting ERISA have generally found them to be
non-accidental.' 6' Why is this?
One explanation might be the view that federal courts are generally more
favorable to insurance companies in interpreting insurance contracts.' 62 Another
might be the "extremely deferential"' 63 standard of review that federal courts
often apply to denials of insurance benefits in ERISA claims. In ERISA cases,
federal courts apply a de novo standard of review "unless the benefit plan gives
the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for
benefits or to construe the terms of the plan.""' When the administrator or
fiduciary has such discretion, the deferential arbitrary and capricious standard of
review applies.'6 5 Federal courts frequently use this standard in ERISA drunk
driving cases.' 6 Indeed, the Oklahoma Supreme Court partly attributed the split

157. Id.
158. ALLSTATE-MADD SURVEY (1997), available at http://www.madd.org/stats/
0,1056,3726,00.html.
159. See Cranfill v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 49 P.3d 703, 707 (Okla. 2002) ("[T]he
split is between the federal courts on one hand and state courts on the other.").
160. See, e.g., Harrell v. Minn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 937 S.W.2d 809 (Tenn. 1996).
161. See, e.g., Cozzie v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 140 F.3d 1104 (7th Cir. 1998). But
see West v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 171 F. Supp. 2d 856 (N.D. Iowa 2001); Metro. Life Ins.
Co. v. Potter, 992 F. Supp. 717 (D.N.J. 1998).
162. See Scales, supranote 108, at 292 (citing Catherine L. Fisk, Lochner Redux:
The Renaissance of Laissez-FaireContractin the FederalCommon Law of Employee
Benefits, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 153, 211 (1995)) ("Many ERISA courts, perhaps skeptical of

the creative interpretations insurance contracts generally receive at the state level, have
committed themselves to a stricter, so-called plain meaning standard of interpretation.").
163. Cozzie, 140 F.3d at 1107.

164. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989).
165. Cozzie, 140 F.3d at 1107.
166. See id. at 1108; Walker v. Metro. Life ns. Co., 24 F. Supp. 2d 775, 779 (E.D.
Mich. 1997); Schultz v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 994 F. Supp. 1419, 1421 (M.D. Fla. 1997);
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol69/iss1/10
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between state and federal courts to the federal courts' use of arbitrary and
capricious review. 67 Notably, several federal courts have found the deaths of
drunk drivers to be non-accidental even on de novo review.168 However, these
courts based their conclusions on the federal common law on the subject of
drunk drivers, which had been created by courts applying the highly deferential
arbitrary and capricious standard of review. 69 Because the federal courts which
have found the deaths of drunk drivers to be non-accidental have done so by
either using the arbitrary and capricious standard or by relying on cases which
did, the Gaddy court's use of these cases as support for the proposition that death
in this circumstance is "reasonably foreseeable" is somewhat less convincing.
Additionally, even though Gaddy was decided by a federal district court, it
was based on state law. Because courts applying state law have overwhelmingly
held that the death of a drunk driver is accidental, 7 ' the Gaddy court's
conclusion that such deaths are not accidental makes the case somewhat of an
outlier.
The reasoning of courts that hold that the death of a drunk driver is not
"accidental" is frustrating, in part because it is often unnecessary. Accidental
death policies usually include specific provisions that exclude certain conduct
from coverage. These provisions often exclude coverage for injuries or deaths
that occur while the insured is committing a crime. '' Many policies also contain
broad provisions that exclude coverage if injury or death is a consequence of the
insured's intoxication.'7 2 Some policies even contain clauses that specifically

Miller v. Auto-Alliance Int'l, Inc., 953 F. Supp. 172, 175 (E.D. Mich. 1997); Cates v.
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1027 (E.D. Tenn. 1996); Fowler v. Metro. Life
Ins. Co., 938 F.Supp. 476,479 (W.D. Tenn. 1996). Butsee Poeppel v. Hartford Life Ins.
Co., 273 F. Supp. 2d 714, 717 (D.S.C. 2003) (de novo review); Mullaney v. Aetna U.S.
Heathcare, 103 F. Supp. 2d 486,490 (D.R.I. 2000) (de novo review); Nelson v. Sun Life
Assurance Co. of Can., 962 F. Supp. 1010, 1012 (W.D. Mich. 1997) (de novo review).
167. See Cranfill v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 49 P.3d 703, 707 (Okla. 2002)
(acknowledging split between state and federal courts and observing that "in most ERISA
cases, the federal courts must affirm the denial of benefits unless the decision to deny
benefits was arbitrary and capricious").
168. See Poeppel, 273 F. Supp. 2d at 714; Mullaney, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 486;
Nelson, 962 F. Supp. at 1010.
169. See Poeppel,273 F. Supp. 2d at 719-20; Mullaney, 103 F. Supp. 2d at 493-94
(citing Cozzie, 140 F.3d at 1104; Walker, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 775; Cates, 14 F. Supp. 2d
at 1024; Schultz, 994 F. Supp. at 1419); Nelson, 962 F. Supp. at 1012 (citingFowler,938
F. Supp. at 476).
170. See, e.g., Fryman v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 704 S.W.2d 205 (Ky. 1986).
171. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Sierra Health & Life Ins. Co., 53 P.3d 904 (Nev. 2002)
(holding that death of an insured caused by drunk driving was not covered by policy
because of provision that precluded coverage if the insured died while committing a
felony).
172. See Russ, supranote 126, at § 142:46.
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preclude coverage for deaths that result from the insured's driving while
intoxicated. Ironically, Charles Gaddy's policy contained such a provision. "'
However, the Gaddy court did not address the validity of this provision because
it found, more generally, that Gaddy's death was not an accident because it was
a "probable and natural consequence" of his driving while intoxicated. 74 This
reasoning is fi-ustrating, not only because it is contrary to the expectations of the
public, but also because it was probably unnecessary, as Gaddy's policy would
have likely excluded coverage based on the drunk driving provision. " '
Oftentimes, courts will not have to make such leaps of logic to conclude that
deaths are non-accidental because exclusionary clauses will deny coverage
anyway. If insurance companies want to exclude drunk driving deaths, they
should include such provisions in their policies. 76 Indeed, several courts have
said as much in cases where they have concluded that the death of a drunk driver
was accidental.' 77
Critics have asserted that the cases that hold a drunk driving death to be
non-accidental base their reasoning on normative views rather than reasonable
expectations.'
The critics argue that the courts equate "accidental" with
"innocent.', 179 Drunk driving is a violation of social mores. It is also a crime. "o
Courts' conclusions that driving while intoxicated would make a reasonable
person believe death was likely may be based on normative views that drunk
driving is a bad thing that should be discouraged, rather than on the true
expectations of reasonable people. 8 '
173. Gaddy v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 218 F.Supp. 2d 1123, 1126 (E.D. Mo. 2002).
174. Id. at 1127-29.
175. The same was true in Nelson v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada,962 F.
Supp. 2d 1010 (W.D. Mich. 1997), where the court found a drunk driver's death to be
non-accidental even though the insurance policy contained an exclusion for deaths
resulting from the commission of a crime. Id. at 1013.
176. Insurance companies should use specific provisions denying coverage for
deaths resulting from drunk driving. Courts have not always found such deaths to be
covered by general "commission of crime" exclusions. See Adkins v. Home Life Ins.
Co., 372 N.W.2d 671,673 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that drunk driving did not fall
under crime exclusion because exclusion was ambiguous as to whether it covered driving
while intoxicated).
177. See, e.g., Am. Family Life Assurance Co. v. Bilyeu, 921 F.2d 87, 89 (6th Cir.
1990) ("[A]n explicit provision excluding alcohol-related accidents would have been an
obvious option if American Life did not wish to provide coverage for such accidents.");
Freeman v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 580 S.W.2d 897,901 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (stating that
if insurance company desired to exclude drunk driving deaths from coverage, "it could
have easily done so by inserting in the policy an appropriate exclusion").
178. See Scales, supra note 108, at 298-99.
179. Id. at 299.
180. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 577.012 (2000).
181. See Scales, supra note 108, at 299.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Drunk driving is, to be sure, a foolish and reckless act. However, when an
insured dies as a consequence of his driving while intoxicated, his death should
still be considered "accidental" because a reasonable person would not view
death as a natural and probable consequence of drunk driving. This notion is
supported by both survey data and traffic statistics. In Gaddy v. HartfordLife
InsuranceCo.,182 the court nevertheless found such a death to be non-accidental.
Courts applying state law that examine this issue in the future should view
Gaddy as an outlier and should follow the reasoning of all of the other state court
decisions, which have found these types of deaths to be "accidental." Federal
courts applying ERISA in this context should follow Potterand West rather than
the other ERISA drunk driving cases, which have made unrealistic and
unsupported assertions of what reasonable people would expect. In any event,
courts should not stretch logic in order to support the conclusion that the death
of a drunk driver is not "accidental."
MICHAEL E. GARDNER

182. 218 F. Supp. 2d 1123 (E.D. Mo. 2002).
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